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Several years ago, Dr G. Breaking was the foremost proponent of a new surgical procedure, which was named after him.
At a recent national meeting, he discussed a paper that modified the procedure and criticized the presenter’s revisions as
dangerous—risking increased paralysis. GB’s unedited comments were published last month in the specialty’s leading
journal. Today, an attorney called the office representing a surgical patient who suffered paralysis after undergoing the
modified procedure. GB has unremittingly avoided involvement in litigation. The plaintiff’s attorney asks him to serve as
an expert witness against the surgeon. What should GB do?
A. Refuse involvement because the medical tort system is a farce.
B. Explain that opinions expressed in his published critique represented intellectual jousting.
C. Claim that he is too busy and decline to be involved.
D. Agree to review the records objectively.
E. Testify and establish a Web page advertising further availability as a plaintiff’s witness.
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tYep, son, we have met the enemy and he is us.
—Pogo, 1972.
With the exclusivity of independent legal professional-
ism granted to physicians came the obligation to self-
regulate. Medical boards, professional organizations, and
medical facilities all have physicians determining standards
of practice—including medical tort, where the regulators
are least regulated.
The mention of medical liability from malpractice
claims to a physician provokes many considerations, all
negative. Medical tort has lofty legitimate intents, seeking
compensation for those injured through negligence, iden-
tifying and chastising inadequate practitioners, and thus,
improving medical services and patient care. Physicians are
properly disturbed by what they perceive as a tempest of
frivolous claims, misplaced blame, disproportionate mone-
tary awards, and contemptible insurance premiums. And
they are mostly correct. The report card of medical tort law
is dismal.
“In reviewing 500 malpractice cases from the United
Kingdom, a much more conservative legal environment
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528han the US, only 19% were considered to involve incom-
etent care.”1 In a large multistate US study, 46% of those
warded judgments did not experience malpractice and
1% of those suing and compensated did not experience an
dverse event from medical practice.2 Further studies con-
rmed this: almost half of successful suits were from cases
ith incorrect allegations,1 and about half of cases that
eceived monetary awards had no clinical errors.3 More
isturbing, of the billions of dollars doled out by insurers,
o compensate alleged victims of malpractice, a shocking
8% went to attorneys and trial costs.4,5 Medical tort raises
he cost of medicine by encouraging defensive medicine as
shield. It is estimated to increase the cost of medical
ractice by as much as 9%.6
When authors examined14,000 medical records and
etermined a group of patients they categorized as having
een harmed by negligent care, they found only 3% found
ttorneys willing to file tort claims.7 This illustrates the first
aw in the system: legal contingency. Troubled patients or
heir families consult with attorneys, and the attorney de-
ide whether to invest considerable time and money in a
awsuit. Plaintiffs’ attorneys profile and accept cases based
n the size of the economic burden, severity of the injury,
nd worthiness of the defendant physician.8 The defining
riteria are: is the case winnable and will it pay enough to
ake the gamble?
Many states have legislated medical tort reform of
iffering types, with varied successes. Since the motivation
s money, limits to the nonfinancial awards works best to
imit lawsuits. One major medical center in Texas found
hat the rate of malpractice cases filed dropped fivefold after
edical tort reform.9 Thus, medical tort reform has done a
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Volume 56, Number 2 Jones and McCullough 529great deal to lessen the professional liability burden, but
medical tort remains a multibillion-dollar problem.
The second step in the litigation process is to have a
handsomely paid medical expert opine four things, all re-
quired to establish tort liability: (1) that there was an injury;
(2) that there was a standard of care breech; (3) the injury
was the result of that breech; and (4) the injury resulted in
loss. At this point, the attorney has already decided to take
the case if the expert decides there was malpractice. The
expert’s present and future compensation depends on a
conclusion of malpractice. This arrangement hardly pro-
vides a bastion of objectivity. Expert medical witnesses
provide opinions deeply influenced by self-interest.
When a panel of experts examined litigated surgical
medical records separately, there was full agreement con-
cerning malpractice issues only 10% of the time.10 When
shown the results, the experts recommended that more
than one expert should be required for each side. When
pairs of experts reviewed tort cases, they reached agreement
62% of the time.11 Suggested recommendations to improve
expert testimony include independent court-appointed ex-
perts, central filing of opinion letters by experts with au-
thoritative text citations, and a sanction process by courts
and/or authorized boards for testimony that is deemed
inaccurate, false, or contradictory to the standard of care.12
All of the stakeholders in the professional liability crisis
share an ethical obligation to preserve the integrity of the
legal system.13 The moral logic of this obligation is that it
constrains the self-interests of plaintiff and defense lawyers,
plaintiffs and defendants, and especially, expert witnesses.
Expert witnesses who do not fulfill this obligation become the
medical tort system’s Achilles’ heel because they violate their
ethical obligation to provide quality medical expert testimony.
The integrity, especially truth-value, of medical tort legal
processes depends on the trustworthiness of medical expert
testimony.
Not to participate because a necessary system is flawed
is inadequate because GB should fulfill his professional
obligation to improve the system. Option A is out, because
it rests on false belief and is also dangerously self-serving.
Dismissing what was proposed at a major professional
meeting, the most important means for disseminating in-
formation, reflects poorly on the character, professionalism,
and integrity of GB. If in fact his refutation was egotistical
gamesmanship, he deserves rebuke for polluting scientific
literature. Likewise, lying as an excuse not to do one’s duty
is unjust. Option B is ethically twice bad.
Option C, that GB cannot spare his time to defend a
clinical advance of his own device against dangerous mis-
use, abandons his professional responsibility to protect the
integrity of surgery. Moreover, Dr Breaking’s legitimate
self-interests are not served by this posture, making option
C completely unacceptable (however understandable it
might be as a matter of mere personal convenience).
Option E provides an example of egregious self-interest
and, therefore, should be eschewed by all professionally
conscientious physicians who provide expert testimony.Option D, providing expert testimony consistent with
B’s published opinions about this surgical procedure,
fter objectively reviewing the case records, is the correct
thical course. Such testimony may or may not support the
laintiff’s claim. Being retained by one side or the other in
itigation activates self-interest that must be promptly and
ffectively disciplined by fulfilling one’s ethical obligation
o the integrity of the legal system. In addition, providing
ntegrity-based expert testimony honors GB’s responsibil-
ty to participate in the medical profession’s self-regulation
bligation, that medical judgments remain within the prov-
nce of those professionally competent to make them. He
ay help to protect future patients from similar injury while
rticulating the medical profession’s disapprobation of phy-
icians who practice recklessly and despite the cautions of
xperts in their own specialty. As for the notion that expert
estimony on behalf of a plaintiff betrays colleagues and
eakens the medical profession, the process actually dem-
nstrates how medicine places scientific truth and respon-
ible treatment above a guild mentality of unquestioning
elf-protection that violates the ethical concept of medicine
s a public trust. By confirming these ideals, we justify
ather than diminish the public trust and the esteem in
hich our profession is widely held.
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